Mechanistic emergence : different properties, different levels, same thing! ; a commentary on Carl F. Craver by Martin, Denis C.
Mechanistic Emergence: Different 
Properties, Different Levels, Same 
Thing!
A Commentary on Carl F. Craver
Denis C. Martin
In this commentary I will briefly sketch the notion of “levels of mechanisms” as
presented by Carl Craver and propose that we extend it to a more general notion
of “level” that ensures wider applicability. The account of levels I develop is es-
sentially based on an account of “properties”, claiming dependence of instanti-
ation on a certain epistemic context. The main goal is then to reconcile Craver‘s
notion of “mechanisms” with “emergence” resulting in a contemporary account of
“mechanistic emergence” implementing the developed concept of a level. Such an
account could provide explanatory potential for and elucidate on seemingly mys-
terious higher-level properties and their ontology.
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1 Introduction
Are mind and brain on the same level? Mental
properties and biological properties are so dif-
ferent that some kind of dualism is still an at-
tractive  position  for  many people.  Intuitively,
mental phenomena are often assumed to be on
some kind of higher level than physical phenom-
ena.  For  example,  in  order  to  accurately  de-
scribe what it means to have compassion for an-
other living being, most people would probably
agree  with  the  popular  expression  that  this
simply cannot  amount to nothing but the de-
scription  of  the  underlying  neurophysiological
activity or behaviour related to that compassion
—that presenting the neurophysiological activ-
ity alone does not fully capture all properties of
being in a state of compassion. Instead, espe-
cially in everyday life, we might rather refer to
the phenomenological properties of compassion,
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the properties we draw on to identify that we
are in a state of compassion at a given time.
These properties seem to have a special value
for us. In a way, they seem to be much richer
than those of “cold” science. But what, exactly,
does it mean to say that mental and physical
phenomena are not on the same level? If I were
to ask what compassion is, most people would
probably agree that it is somehow realized by
their body, just as an elaboration of this fact
does not  suffice  for  a  complete  description of
compassion, implying that there must be some-
thing more than that, on a higher level. This, at
least for a philosopher, inevitably leads to the
question of what those levels actually are. What
does “level” refer to? To what extent do levels
exist in the world at all? These questions be-
come  even  more  pressing  when  we  make
ourselves aware of the extent to which the sci-
ences use the concept of “level”. Whole discip-
lines, such as psychology and neuroscience, are
distinguished  as  operating  on  different  levels
with different theories aiming at specific target
phenomena. Levels also play a role within dis-
ciplines. In neuroscience, for example, it is quite
common  to  distinguish  between  lower-level
brain functions as realized in the brain stem or
primary sensory areas as opposed to higher-level
functions like decision-making or emotion regu-
lation  that  are  attributed  primarily  to  the
frontal  lobe.  Likewise,  the  distinction  of  pro-
cesses and functions as operating “bottom-up”
or “top-down” is quite prevalent. 
There is a general strategy in science that
has proven to be effective for explaining a cer-
tain  phenomenon:  decomposition.  The  reason
for that  is  as follows:  to fully explain a phe-
nomenon, it does not suffice for us to be able to
elaborately  describe  it  or  list  certain  correla-
tions  with  singular  components  or  other  phe-
nomena. Rather, we need to know in detail how
the phenomenon comes into existence, based on
how  exactly  it  is  realized:  which  components
underlying  the  phenomenon  are  doing  what,
where,  when,  and  how in  order  to  make  the
phenomenon  emerge.  These  requirements  are
captured  excellently  by  Carl Craver’s  (2007;
Craver & Darden 2013, p. 15) famous definition
of a mechanistic explanation:
mechadef/mechanistic  explanation  =Df
[m]echanisms are entities and activities or-
ganized such that they are productive of
regular changes from start or set-up to fin-
ish or  termination conditions.  (Craver &
Darden 2013, p. 15)
But in what sense are the mechanistic compon-
ents of a phenomenon on a lower level than the
whole phenomenon? This is the question Craver
answers in his article “Levels”, in this collection.
In what follows, I  shall  first point out I
find most important about Craver’s account of
levels of mechanisms and where I see some diffi-
culties in his account. I shall then propose an
alternative way of defining levels by emphasiz-
ing the notion of “properties”. The idea here is
that levels are a direct result of property instan-
tiations  and  thereby  constitute  “property-de-
pendent epistemic dimensions”. By focusing on
properties in general, and not only on proper-
ties of mechanisms, I hope to show that an ac-
count of levels does not have to be as restricted
as Craver proposes. I shall also argue that levels
of mechanisms and levels of emergence do not
have to be conceived as necessarily distinct, but
can rather be combined quite well into a pro-
ductive account of mechanistic emergence. Ex-
panding  Craver’s  account  of  levels  this  way
provides not only a notion of levels with wider
applicability but also builds on his account of
mechanisms  as  operating  on  different  levels,
which instils explanatory potential into a con-
temporary account of emergence. This still se-
cures the application of “levels” in science, but
at  the  same time makes  transparent  how the
epistemic contexts of science are property- and
level-generative.  The ultimate goal of  this ap-
proach is, of course, to elucidate how one and
the  same  material  system  may  show  signific-
antly different properties to an extent that eli-
cits serious confusions about matters of identity.
2 Levels of mechanisms
First of all, the approach Craver takes for defin-
ing levels is notable in many ways. What I find
especially important, however, is that he devel-
ops his definition in an interdisciplinary frame-
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work,  paying  close  attention  to  compatibility
with  or  even  application  in  neuroscience.  So
what are levels as used in such a scientific con-
text? In his article of this volume, Craver ex-
tends  his  original  definition  of  mechanisms  a
little to accommodate for the existence of lower-
level mechanisms that take part in the realiza-
tion of higher-level mechanisms. 
I use the term ‘mechanism’ permissively to
describe  non-aggregative  compositional
systems  in  which  the  parts  interact  and
collectively  realize  the  behavior  or  prop-
erty  of  the  whole.  Mechanisms  are  by
definition  more  than  the  sums  of  their
parts: they have properties their parts do
not  have,  and  they  engage  in  activities
that  their  parts  cannot  accomplish  on
their own. (Craver this collection, p. 16)
Mechanisms as construed here are entities and
activities organized in non-aggregative composi-
tional systems, such that they are productive of
regular changes from start or set-up to finish or
termination  conditions,  and  the  properties  of
the whole mechanism are produced collectively
through the interaction of its component mech-
anisms. This establishes the basis for Craver’s
introduction of levels of mechanisms. 
Craver’s three defining questions—namely
about the relata, the relations, and their place-
ment—constitute a valuable contribution to the
conceptual clarification of the term “level” help-
ing to capture the criteria for the correct usage
of the term. This already hints at the descript-
ive  pluralism  Craver  promotes,  meaning  that
there is a set of equally correct ways to use the
term depending  on  the  respective  answers  to
these three key questions. In the case of mech-
anisms, levels are best individuated, according
to Craver, in terms of a part–whole relationship
between the property “ -ing” of S, given that Sψ
is  a mechanism as a whole,  and the property
“ -ing” of X, given that X is a mechanism comϕ -
ponent  that  is  a  constitutively relevant spati-
otemporal part of S.
Summing  up  Craver’s  position  on  levels
and  levels  of  mechanisms  as  I  understand  it,
they:
• are metaphors with multiple distinct con-
ditions of correct usage dependent on the
relata, relations, and their placement and
• refer to part–whole relationships.
• Levels of mechanisms have  properties of
mechanisms and properties of their parts
as  their relata (as  opposed to levels  of
size, which have objects as their relata), 
• are  always  non-aggregative (though  ag-
gregative levels do also exist), 
• are not monolithic, but constitute a local
organizational  part–whole  hierarchy,
while 
• the part–whole relationship must satisfy
the  constitutive  relevance  condition;1
while 
• there is no causal relation between them,
• they bear explanatory potential,
• and, finally, the placement of entities on
levels of mechanisms is weak in the sense
that for all entities that are not related
as  part  and whole  it  can  be  said  that
they are on the same level. 
What might the difficulties with this account of
levels be? As a minor point, first, there might
be  some  implications  of  using  the  concept
“metaphor” in connection with levels. By defini-
tion,  a  “metaphor”  identifies  two  things—a
primary and secondary subject—with one  an-
other, such that one of the two can be captured
in  description  more  powerfully  (Hills 2010).
What could the primary and secondary subject
in  a  level-metaphor  be?  The  primary  subject
would probably be a level in the sense of a level
of  mechanisms,  the  secondary  subject  could
maybe be a plane, a stage, or a degree. But how
would  that  help  elucidate  what  the  primary
subject levels actually are? As far as I can see,
using “level” as a metaphor would more effect-
ively  describe what a level is, but not actually
define it and, thereby, simply capture what our
intuition  about  levels  is  in  the  first  place—
namely that it is somewhat analogous to a level
in the secondary subject sense. Also, it seems
that conceiving of “levels” as a metaphor would
1 “Constitutive  relevance”:  “[…]  all  the lower-level  properties, activities,
and organizational features of the parts are relevant to—contribute to—
the property or activity of the whole” (Craver this collection, p. 15).
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already somewhat negatively answer the ques-
tion of what levels actually are, as solely exist-
ent as a figure of speech—an analogy that could
be  eliminated  without  any  ramifications.
Craver’s descriptive pluralist approach is formu-
lated  specifically  to  counteract  elimination  of
levels and thereby to sustain their application in
science.  However,  descriptive  pluralism  obvi-
ously  does  still  act  on  the  assumption  that
levels are metaphors, and only describes condi-
tions that fit their application better than oth-
ers. Therefore, this approach does not seem to
be particularly helpful for our intended and cer-
tainly desirable goal. 
Another issue I would like to raise is that
in Craver’s account of levels as presented here,
the key defining feature of levels seems to be a
relation condition2 between certain entities. This
already becomes apparent with the three ques-
tions mentioned above,  which aim to help  us
adequately describe specific instances of levels.
Levels of mechanisms in particular are specified
as a part–whole relationship between properties
of  mechanisms  that  are  located  on  different
levels. But does this really capture what  levels
actually are? Or does it rather render the rela-
tion condition  between levels more precise,  in-
stead? While helpful to set the criteria for con-
ditions under which the term “level” is correctly
employed,  and  highlighting  distinguishing  fea-
tures of  different levels,  saying that levels are
essentially relations between sets of entities is at
best  an  indirect  or  descriptive  definition  of
levels and does not seem sufficient for a com-
plete definition. It leaves open how levels come
into existence, what their ontological status is,
and why we posit certain entities on the same
level in the first place, that is, what the com-
monalities of entities are that lead them to be
on the same level.
From the key aspect of a part–whole rela-
tionship in Craver’s  account stems the notion
that levels  are local and non-monolithic.  This
means that only those entities that are involved
in such part–whole relationships can intelligibly
be said to be on different levels. What are our
theoretical options for conceptually covering all
2 “Relation condition”: “the componency relationship between things
at higher and lower levels” (Craver this collection, p. 19).
other entities? Since they don’t fulfil the part–
whole criterion they cannot be on distinct levels
and, therefore,  in a sense they are all  on the
same level. However, according to the definition
of levels at hand, to be on any level means that
there are other levels,  which are distinguished
from the first level by the part–whole relation-
ship of the entities involved. Since the entities
under consideration do not exhibit this kind of
relationship, they are on no level at all. In gen-
eral,  this  seems like a reasonable  option.  But
let’s consider the case that entities that are not
in such a part–whole relationship do, neverthe-
less, share some features—for example a hedge
and a fence both one meter high. In accordance
with levels not being monolithic and the previ-
ous considerations, these would not be on the
same level, but on no level at all. What exactly
is wrong, however, with saying that two entities
sharing the feature of being one meter high but
which are not related as part and whole are on
the same level? One could, of course, simply in-
voke the account of  levels of  mechanisms and
argue that it is designed such as not to warrant
such a level. But does this limitation really pro-
cure  us  a  better  understanding  of  “level”,  or
could it rather be too restrictive for that pur-
pose?  Its  consequence,  at  any rate,  is  a  very
strong focus on the vertical dimension, namely
the  relation  between  levels,  whereas  the  hori-
zontal  dimension,  that  is,  entities  related  qua
being on the same level, is somewhat neglected.
So, let us ask, what are the criteria for two en-
tities being on the same level? It is exactly this
relation between entities on the same level that
the concept  is  primarily  supposed  to capture,
and yet which seems to be underspecified by the
definition  provided.  And  how  similar  do  two
part–whole relationship units have to be in or-
der for it to be correct to say that their respect-
ive wholes and parts are on the same level? Or
does it even follow that two things that are not
part of one and the same part–whole relation-
ship cannot even be on the same level at all?
As a third point, finally, there remains the
issue of the extent to which levels of mechan-
isms are similar or distinct from levels of realiz-
ation  and  emergence,  respectively.  All  three
kinds of levels share that an application of the
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concept of inter-level causation is not feasible in
their  case,  since  they  do  not  fit  classical  as-
sumptions  about  causation  such  as  non-syn-
chronicity of cause and effect—a very substan-
tial point Craver emphasizes in the target art-
icle. But what are the differences between these
kinds of levels? 
According to Craver, levels of mechanisms
and levels of realization seem to differ in that
the  former  exhibit  a  relationship  between
wholes and parts, whereas the latter exhibit a
relationship  between  wholes  and  sets  of  real-
izers.  But  this  distinction  seems  rather  frail.
How are the parts involved in levels of mechan-
isms different from the set of realizers involved
in levels of realization, such as to warrant this
distinction? At least in levels of mechanisms, as
Craver  envisages  them,  the  parts  are  several
mechanisms  that  together  form  the  whole,
which is comprised of all the particular “part-
mechanisms”.  If  mechanisms in  general  realize
certain phenomena, this suggests that all “part-
mechanisms” are also realizers in the same way.
Now,  if  the  “part-mechanisms”  on  the  “part-
levels” are all realizers, it is reasonable to say
that  the  “whole-mechanism”  on  the  “whole-
level” is realized by the organized coaction of its
parts and that the “part-levels” are the realizers
of  the  “whole-level”.  Thus,  the  distinction
between levels of mechanisms and levels of real-
izers conflates. 
The difference between levels of mechan-
isms  and  levels  of  emergence,  on  the  other
hand,  is  based  on  the  unpredictability,  unex-
plainability, and metaphysical novelty of higher-
level properties, as opposed to lower-level ones.
Craver’s point here is that levels of mechanisms,
while they can be unpredictable, do not have to
be so necessarily, that they are always explanat-
ory, and the novelty of higher-level properties is
a trivial fact. But why think that the opposite
must hold in the case of emergence? Of course,
“spooky  emergence”,  “[…]  the  existence  of
higher-level properties that have no explanation
in terms of the parts, activities, and organiza-
tional  features  of  the  system  in  the  relevant
conditions”  (Craver this collection,  p.  21),  is
spooky by definition—that much is clear. Also,
admittedly,  the  way emergence  was  construed
historically  by  the  British  Emergentists  per-
fectly  fits  this  view  and  deliberately  opposes
mechanisms as it can be found, for example, as
per Broad (1925). However, why should we pre-
maturely accept this view of emergence as given
and eliminate any possibility of further develop-
ment towards a notion of emergence that is per-
fectly commensurable with modern science? In
fact, I think the formidable way in which Craver
develops his account of levels of mechanisms is
perfectly suited to facilitate development in this
direction. So what could a definition of emer-
gence be, and how can it be united with mech-
anisms? The following definition of  emergence
by  Evan Thompson (2007) already seems com-
patible with Craver’s framing of the way prop-
erties of higher-level mechanisms are constituted
by properties of lower-level ones. 
A network,  N, of interrelated components
exhibits  an  emergent  process,  E,  with
emergent properties, P, if and only if:
(1)  E is a global process that instantiates
P,  and  arises  from  the  coupling  of  N’s
components  and the  nonlinear  dynamics,
D, of their local interactions.
(2) E and P have a global-to-local (“down-
ward”) determinative influence on the dy-
namics D of the components of N.
And possibly:
(3) E and P are not exhaustively determ-
ined by the intrinsic properties of the com-
ponents of  N, that is, they exhibit “rela-
tional holism.” (p. 418)
This  definition  is  compatible  with  Craver’s
characterization of levels of mechanisms in the
following  respects:  properties  of  higher-level
mechanisms,  global  emergent  properties,  are
realized  by  properties  of  lower  level  mechan-
isms;  and  there  is  a  part–whole  relationship
between those relata, as well as a non-causal in-
fluence  between the  levels.  What  Thompson’s
definition  additionally  contributes  is  a  point
about  predictability.  For  many  phenomena  in
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nature, the interactions of lower-level compon-
ents are so complex that they can only be de-
scribed by non-linear dynamics. A precise pre-
dictability of the higher-level phenomena might
not always be possible at present due to there
being too many factors involved in the underly-
ing processes—it simply exceeds current compu-
tational  tractability.  Craver  acknowledges  this
point—so it can also be said to be consistent
with his account—but worries that this might
have ontological ramifications: “[i]f that explan-
atory relationship is severed, then the sense in
which emergent properties are at a ‘higher-level’
must be altogether different than the composi-
tional notion of levels in levels of mechanisms”
(Craver this collection, p. 21).  More precisely,
he suspects that in emergence ontological nov-
elty  arises  through the  epistemological  limita-
tions just mentioned; otherwise ontological nov-
elty would simply be a banal fact already ex-
pressed by his account. 
There are, however, several problems with
this  view:  first,  one  can  make  a  distinction
between the epistemological (e.g., “predictabil-
ity”) and ontological (e.g., “novelty”) dimension
of emergence (O’Conner &  Wong 2009). There
is,  in principle,  no reason to assume that the
ontological dimension is dependent on the epi-
stemological; rather, they seem to be fully dis-
sociable. 
Second, his criticism backfires with regard
to the banality of  the properties  that  higher-
level mechanisms exhibit in his own account of
levels. For there to be “higher” levels of mech-
anisms, these mechanisms must show new prop-
erties, that is, in order for them to qualifiedly
be on that level. Hence, his account cannot go
without  ontological  novelty  of  some  kind.  To
now say that this ontological novelty would be
only a banal fact undermines his very own striv-
ing for mechanistic explanation, which certainly
is not banal. In fact, it is still interesting how
“higher-level”  properties  come  into  existence,
what it means to say that they are  new,  and
how the concept “level” might be connected to
this. A successful reconciliation of mechanisms
and emergence in the form of mechanistic emer-
gence could provide a solution to this problem.
Third, the dissociability of the epistemolo-
gical  and  ontological  dimension  of  emergence
does not contradict the possibility of their mere
coexistence. Once we dismiss the idea that onto-
logical novelty follows from epistemological in-
tractability, overcoming the restraints of histor-
ical  accounts  of  emergence,  the  fact  that  the
coming  into  existence  of  new properties  on  a
higher level is not tractable at the moment does
not  mean that  it  is  not  so  in  principle.  The
reason  why we  call  this  coming-into-existence
“emergence”, as might be conceived by a revised
account, is not based on the fact that it is epi-
stemically  intractable  in  principle,  but  rather
that it shows novel properties on a higher level
that  appear to be epistemically intractable  in
principle,  while  they might  at  some point  be
very well explained in a mechanistic framework
combined with a proper theory of property in-
stantiation.
Thompson’s  definition  leaves  room  for
local components to be part of a mechanism. A
mechanistic  explanation  of  the  emergent  phe-
nomenon, it seems, would not be incompatible
with an account of emergence, but rather con-
tribute to its explanation by elaborating on how
the  organization  of  the  parts  is  essential  for
emergent properties to arise. As for the ontolo-
gical novelty of higher-level phenomena, this is
certainly a crucial point in emergence: there are
new  properties  coming  into  existence  on  the
higher levels that are somehow realized by pro-
cesses of components on the lower level, which
in isolation do not show the same properties as
the whole.  For  this  to  happen,  however,  con-
trary  to  what  Thompson’s  definition  implies,
the underlying interactions of  the components
or the emergent properties themselves must not
necessarily be unpredictable in principle. But I
anticipate an objection: this form of emergence
would again only be very weak or banal,  but
not  ontologically  new.  As  already  mentioned
above, unpredictability does not have a bearing
on ontological novelty and is therefore not cru-
cial for emergence. What levels of mechanisms
and  emergent  levels  share  is  that  on  higher
levels  there  are  new  properties,  which  means
that  there  is  a  notable  ontological  difference.
How  extensive  such  an  ontological  difference
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must  be  in  order  not  to  be  banal  remains  a
matter of debate. Still, in the case of mechan-
isms, as well as in the case of emergence, it is
very  likely  that  there  is  a  significant  phe-
nomenon making up the higher level—otherwise
it probably would not be of such interest for en-
quiry as it clearly is.
As a result of these thoughts, in what fol-
lows I will try to reconcile levels of mechanisms
and levels of emergence as two interconnected
forms of realization. This alone, of course, does
not  solve  the  problem of  what  the  levels  in-
volved  actually  are.  So  in  fact  there  are  two
problems to be solved for an account of mech-
anistic  emergence:  (a.)  what it  means exactly
for a higher-level  phenomenon to exhibit  new
properties, and (b.) what exactly constitutes a
level. As a route to a possible solution, in the
next section I will sketch a definition of proper-
ties that can be implemented in a definition of
mechanistic  emergence  and  that  at  the  same
time provides a positive account of levels.
3 Level-carving properties in mechanistic
emergence
In this section, I propose an alternative account
of levels that is fully compatible with the mech-
anistic framework and the way in which levels
of  mechanisms  are  construed  by  Craver,  but
which at the same time has a wider scope of ap-
plication. Since this account will rely on proper-
ties as the crucial defining criterion, I shall first
sketch  a  working  definition  of  the  concept  of
“properties”. In a second step, this definition of
“property” will conceptually ground the altern-
ative account of levels. Finally, I will implement
both  the  definition  of  properties  and  that  of
levels into a formulation of  mechanistic  emer-
gence. 
What might be a working definition for
the term “properties”? Inspired by Brian Ellis’
(2002)  “new  essentialism”3 and  Alexander
Bird’s  (2007)  “dispositional  essentialism”,4 I
3 “[...] things must behave in the sorts of ways they do not because the
laws of nature require them to, but rather because this is how they
are intrinsically disposed to behave” (Ellis 2002, pp. 3–4).
4 “[…] the claim that fundamental natural properties are essentially dispos-
itional. […] x is disposed to manifest M in response to stimulus S iff were
x to undergo S x would yield manifestation M” (Bird 2007, p. 24).
propose the following view: what exist in the
world are entities with individual dispositional
profiles. An example that Ellis (2002) gives is
the dispositions of particles to attract or repel
each other. These essential dispositions, indi-
viduating the particles as that which they are,
make it  possible  for  us to formulate  laws of
nature. Many of these dispositions are the res-
ult of structural and organizational combina-
tions  of  matter  with  different  dispositions,
e.g.,  ions  have  the  disposition  to  form ionic
crystals,  which  by  means  of  the  resulting
structural  characteristics  in  turn  have  other
specific  physico-chemical  dispositions.  Those
essential  dispositions alone,  however,  are not
properties  yet.  That  is  because  dispositions
exist  outside  of  an  epistemic  context.  The
property of being one meter high, for example,
is dependent on the disposition of an object to
exactly fit the measurement revealing it to be
the height of one meter. Without the measure-
ment,  however,  the  property  is  not  instanti-
ated—only the disposition of its instantiation
exists  inherently  in  the  structure  of  the  ob-
ject. Thus, according to my theory, properties
are instantiated through the interaction of the
essential  dispositions  of  matter  and  an  epi-
stemic  system.  Of  course,  now  you  will  ask
what this epistemic system could possibly be.
Admittedly, this aspect of the definition is in
a  particularly  embryonic  stage  and  requires
further  research.  As  a  general  characteriza-
tion,  epistemic  systems  are  structured  such
that they feature sensors or gauges that cap-
ture  specific  dispositions  of  entities  and
provide  characteristic  values  as  an  output.
Human  and  non-human  animals,  as  well  as
physical devices of measurement, are epistemic
systems in this sense. Let us note the follow-
ing as a working definition of “epistemic sys-
tem”:
Epistemic system =Df (ES) Epistemic sys-
tems are organized (a.) such as they fea-
ture sensors or gauges that pick up a spe-
cific disposition exhibited by an entity and
(b.) such as there is  a transformation of
that signal into a particular value charac-
teristic of the system’s organization.
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With this definition at hand we are able to for-
mulate a working definition of properties:
Properties =Df (P) Properties are instanti-
ated  through  epistemic  processes,  which
are  constituted  by  interactions  between
epistemic systems and complementary dis-
positional profiles of entities.
Let us now turn to how levels depend on prop-
erties.  The idea here is  that  levels  are estab-
lished by the epistemic systems in use that in-
stantiate the properties which belong to the re-
spective level. Measuring ion conductance at an
axon with  electrodes,  for  example,  establishes
properties on a cytological level; whereas meas-
uring reaction times of participants in a behavi-
oural  experiment  establishes  properties  on  a
psychological level. The way in which different
epistemic systems — e.g., a functional magnetic
resonance imaging (f) scanner and a blood test
— applied on the same entity — a human —
establish different properties — a local decrease
in  de-oxygenated  heamoglobin  versus,  for  in-
stance, cortisol levels in the bloodstream — on
different levels — the level of brain activation
versus the level of endocrine activation — shows
that levels and properties are intimately connec-
ted. Coming back to our example from the be-
ginning, different properties of the mental state
compassion are instantiated in several ways: (a.)
through a person as an epistemic system direc-
ted towards a myriad of  dispositional  interac-
tions of her own body, which can then (b.) be
picked up as  values  of  standardized  question-
naires probing those experiences while, finally,
(c.) some properties of the underlying mechan-
ism of compassion are instantiated by means of
fMRI (cf. Klimecki et al. 2014). What becomes
strikingly apparent in this example is that each
of these different ways of property instantiation
yields properties  we would intuitively base on
very different levels. Experience of compassion
seems to have a very different quality and com-
plexity to the more abstract numerical values of
questionnaires or activation patterns visualized
by fMRI. Thus, we can say that the specific way
a certain property is instantiated already estab-
lishes a corresponding level. This way of defin-
ing levels offers a broader range of application
than the levels of mechanisms account, since it
is  not  restricted  to  properties  of  mechanisms
but rather bears on properties in general. After
these considerations, we are now in a position
to put down the following as a working defini-
tion of levels:
Levels =Df (L) Levels are sets of properties
established with respect to their instanti-
ation through the same or a similar kind
of  epistemic  system,  which  targets  the
same or a similar dispositional profile as
compared  to  different  epistemic  systems
targeting different dispositional profiles.
Considering  the  identity  criteria  of  epistemic
systems, an epistemic system identical to itself
might  be  involved in  the instantiation  of  two
properties, that are on the same level qua being
picked up by the said epistemic system—for ex-
ample,  a  ruler  instantiating  the  length  of  1
meter  and 20 centimetres.  Two epistemic sys-
tems  are  similar  if  they  pick  up  exactly  the
same kind of dispositions and exhibit a similar
dimension  of  output  value.  For  example,  two
rulers  picking  up the  dispositions  of  a  set  of
tables to instantiate the height of 1 meter and
59.1 inches (1.5 m) or two humans seeing the
color blue. Note that the properties might be
different in these cases but they are still on the
same level,  since they are instantiated by the
same or similar epistemic system. A ruler and
an infrared  detector,  for  instance,  are  neither
identical  nor  similar  epistemic  systems,  since
they differ in the kind of dispositions they pick
up and have different dimensions of output val-
ues. 
Having  provided  the  two  missing  defini-
tions for an account of emergence, let us now
consider how these can be connected to mechan-
isms and implemented  into  a  new account  of
mechanistic  emergence.  What could properties
of mechanisms be? According to the definition
of  mechanisms  given  in  the  introduction,  we
have to identify entities and activities belonging
to the mechanism, as well as starting and ter-
mination conditions. These might all be estab-
lished  by property-instantiating  epistemic  sys-
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tems.  We  decompose,  measure,  and  intervene
with the phenomena or their realizing compon-
ents to establish temporal, functional, or organ-
izational  properties.  Properties  of  mechanisms
on higher levels are instantiated differently to
properties  of  mechanisms  on lower  levels.  We
can use one epistemic system to track particular
sequences  within  a  mechanism  on  a  specific
level in order to be able to recognize stepwise
changes as they unfold in temporal order. For
properties on higher levels, however, we have to
change the kind of epistemic systems involved.
We are dealing with different properties  on a
different level, and we cannot capture the same
causal chain as in the single lower-level mechan-
ism. Instead, we capture a synchronously emer-
gent property on a higher level. A formulation
of  such  an  account  of  mechanistic  emergence
that  incorporates  the  above  definitions  of
“properties” and “levels” could be constructed
as follows:
Mechanistic emergence =Df (ME) Mechan-
istic emergence is a special form of prop-
erty instantiation, in which the novelty of
the properties is established by a change
in epistemic systems involved in their in-
stantiation and through which they span a
higher level compared to the level of the
components, which realize the higher-level
properties  by means of  their  mechanistic
organization  and  process  dynamics,
thereby changing the overall dispositional
profile  of  the  whole  while,  at  the  same
time,  being  constrained  with  respect  to
their  individual  dispositions  in  virtue  of
the  synchronous,  non-causal  constituency
relation. 
What is  new in this  account  of  emergence  is
that it acknowledges how even emergent proper-
ties ultimately arise out of perfectly explainable
mechanistic processes. Unpredictability or unex-
plainability are no longer the defining character-
istics  of  emergent  properties  themselves,  but
only characteristics of the  epistemic context in-
volved  in  their  instantiation.  However,  these
emergent properties are still  novel in the sense
that  they  are  non-causal,  non-aggregative
products of  mechanisms that come into exist-
ence only on a higher level, established through
the kind of property instantiation that none of
the components show in isolation. 
4 Conclusion
In this commentary my aim has been to point
out (i.) that defining levels as crucially depend-
ent on properties has a wider and more flexible
range of application than using part–whole rela-
tionships as the defining criterion; and to put
forward  (ii.)  that  levels  of  mechanisms  and
levels of emergence can be reconciled into an ac-
count  of  mechanistic  emergence  in  which  the
property-dependent definition of levels finds ap-
plication. 
My  argument  was  (a.)  that  descriptive
pluralism, by conceiving of levels essentially as
metaphors,  cannot  yield  sufficient  conceptual
clarification  concerning  the  term  “level”—
namely, what levels actually are and how they
exist  and,  even  undermines  the  goal  of  pre-
serving the use of the concept in science. Fur-
ther, I highlighted (b.) that in “levels of mech-
anisms”, as presented by Carl Craver, the core
criterion for  a  definition  of  “level”  is  a  part–
whole  relationship  in  conjunction  with  a  con-
stitutive relevance constraint, and that this fo-
cuses solely on the vertical dimension existing
between levels, and completely omits the more
important  horizontal  dimension  of  the  condi-
tions that must apply for a set of entities to be
on the same level. As such, the concept is only
very weakly and indirectly characterized, offer-
ing  little  toward  its  clarification  and  broader
application. Finally, I showed (c.) that ontolo-
gical novelty is not dependent on epistemic in-
tractability, and that the ontological novelty of
properties on higher levels of mechanisms is not
a banal fact either in levels of mechanisms or in
levels of emergence. What emergence expresses
at its  core is  that  new properties  are coming
into existence and that  they are so strikingly
novel that they might not be predictable at the
moment—or seem to not be so, even in prin-
ciple. They are novel to such a degree that their
instantiation  coinstantaneously  establishes  a
wholly new level. 
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As  positive  proposals  for  an  alternative
view, I defined (d.) “properties” as instantiated
by epistemic systems capturing specific disposi-
tional  profiles  of  entities,  and (e.)  “levels”  as
sets of such properties instantiated by the same
or a similar epistemic system, as compared to
those  properties  instantiated  by  another  epi-
stemic  system.  Furthermore,  I  (f.)  provided  a
definition  of  “mechanistic  emergence”  imple-
menting  the  core  idea  of  emergence  as  afore-
mentioned,  together  with the proposed defini-
tions of “levels” and “properties”.
Concerning future directions for research,
it  seems most pressing to further develop the
notion of an “epistemic system”. Moreover, the
notion  of  “levels”  needs  to be  further  refined
with regard to how much epistemic systems can
or must differ in order for there to be a new
level. Ultimately, of course, it will be intriguing
to see whether the developed definitions hold in
the  light  of  practical  implementations  in  sci-
entific contexts. 
To finish, let us come back to the initial
question of  whether mind and brain,  or more
precisely  mental  processes  and  neurobiological
processes, are on the same level, which we are
now in a better position to answer. So far as we
acknowledge that mental properties and proper-
ties of the brain are different properties, and if
we also consider how I defined levels above, we
can conclude that mind and brain are in fact on
different levels in this sense.  But are we thus
slipping  back  into  dualism?  Absolutely  not,
since  the  definition  of  properties  developed
above  makes  clear  how  it  comes  about  that
there can be different properties of one and the
same thing: it is dependent on the kind of epi-
stemic system in use to capture specific disposi-
tions or, in short, on the epistemic context. Tak-
ing up our example of compassion once again, it
is  now obvious  why the  phenomenon did not
seem to be fully captured only by reference to,
for instance, physiological properties. Of course
it makes sense to investigate the physiological
realization  of  compassion,  to  measure  auto-
nomic parameters, conduct blood tests, or un-
dertake fMRI scans, but it is equally important
to conduct behavioural experiments or even in-
terviews  with  participants  to  target  the  phe-
nomenological  experience  that  encompasses
compassion (cf. Singer & Bolz 2013). This only
means that we are doing research on all the dif-
ferent properties of the phenomenon of compas-
sion. We are doing research in different discip-
lines with different methods, on different levels,
and we are capturing different properties of one
and the same thing—so let’s work together to
incrementally integrate those epistemic contexts
and get the complete picture.
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